The Inefficient Secret:Organizing for Business in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789–1861 by Stewart, Charles
The Inefficient Secret:
Organizing for Business in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789–1861
Charles Stewart III
cstewart@mit.edu
Department of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Draft of August 25, 1999
Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
Atlanta, Georgia, September 1–5, 1999.  Donald Gordon assisted in gathering the speakership
election data used in this paper.
The Inefficient Secret:
Organizing for Business in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789–1861
Charles Stewart III
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Students of the American Congress are often disappointed by the institution we study.  A major
reason is the relatively mechanical fashion by which both chambers of Congress organize
themselves every two years.  In a world in which most national legislatures, at least some of the
time, are organized through intense coalition negotiations, control of Congress goes fairly
mechanically to the party with the most seats.  The little inter-party strife that emerges every two
years is typically harmless and dealt with in short order.  While the drama of a deadlocked
presidential nominating convention has eluded students of American politics for the lifetime of
most political scientists, the drama of a deadlocked House of Representatives has eluded us for
the lifetime of political science.
It has not always been thus.  Before the Civil War, deadlock over the organization of the
United States House of Representatives was common.  Over one-third of all speakership contests
from the founding of the Republic until the outbreak of the Civil War (14 of 41) took more than
one ballot to resolve.  And at least two of the 27 single-ballot speakership elections during that
time were resolved in favor of a candidate whose party held a minority of House seats.
Stability in Congress is taken so axiomatically in congressional studies that when public
choice theory started to suggest that Congress should exhibit deep, fundamental instability in its
aggregate behavior, the major research program for a generation of scholars revolved around
answering the question “why so much stability?” (Tullock 1981). The most influential answer to
that question was given by Shepsle and Weingast (1981), who articulated the concept of the
structure-induced equilibrium (SIE).  
2Left largely unexplored by the generation of scholars that followed in the path blazed by
Shepsle and Weingast is the path by which the American Congress, and particularly the House,
honed the SIE solution.  As followers of the SIE tradition, we are presumably immune from the
functionalist fallacy that asserts that the House had to find a way of inducing stability, because of
its role as the legislative body in society.  As students of legislative history, and as students of
America’s subnational legislatures, we also know that the modern American House simply
anchors one end of the distribution of structure-encrusted legislatures on the North American
continent.  Therefore, the origins of the SIE solution to social choice chaos remains an important
topic of research for legislative scholars.
My long-range goal is to answer the question, “How did members of Congress figure out
that institutions would solve the most important social choice problems facing them?” 
Preliminary to answering that question is addressing another: “What was legislative life in
Congress like before the congressional institutions themselves reached equilibrium?”  A small part
of the answer to that question is understanding how the House organized itself for business in its
early history.  Therefore,  the purpose of this paper is to explore speakership elections in the
House of Representatives in the pre-Civil War, antebellum period, which was the foundation of
the House’s organization.
Empirical research into parliamentary fights over the organization of the antebellum House
has been spotty and anecdotal.  A comprehensive exploration of these cases will require a two-
pronged approach, building a series of narrative accounts alongside more systematic, quantitative
analysis.  Although spotty and inconsistent, Leintz’s research (1978) provides a catalogue of
narratives of speakership battles from the 1st to the 36th Congresses.  For the moment, at least,
31Leintz’s essay is the most extensive research devoted specifically to the topic of this
paper.  Other notable original research and secondary accounts can be found in Follett (1896),
Young (1967), Congressional Quarterly (1982), Peters (1997), and Jenkins and Nokken (1997).
2Jenkins and Nokken’s (1997) research on the speakership contest of 1855–1856 is the
first analysis of multi-ballot speakership contests to use modern social scientific theories and
measurement techniques.
we can rely on this research to set the stage for most speakership contests— informing us of the
identities of the dramitis personae, along with their strategic goals and tactical maneuvers.1
What is lacking in Leintz’s research, and in the research of virtually all political scientists
and historians who have studied this issue, is systematic quantitative analysis of speakership
contests, owing to two important data problems.2  First, the House elected the Speaker via a
secret ballot for the first half-century of its history.  Until the onset of viva voce balloting for
Speaker (and other House officers, such as Clerk) in the 26th Congress, the House left no direct
evidence about who supported whom at any step in the process.  What is more, until the 26th
Congress, the House Journal did not regularly record even the aggregate vote returns for the
various speakership candidates, requiring us to rely on occasionally questionable and incomplete
newspaper accounts in order to analyze the aggregate results.  Second, even after the inception of
public balloting for Speaker, the standard electronic versions of House roll call votes omit the
balloting for House officers. (See ICPSR study 0004.)  Even when speakership ballots are
included in the electronic files, only the votes received by the leading candidates are typically
recorded, seriously limiting our ability to analyze razor-thin elections in which the ballots of
pivotal voters are often recorded in the catch-all category of “scattering.”
Therefore, the most important empirical goal of this paper is to overcome the lack of
research at the micro level into antebellum speakership battles by collecting and reporting 
43This is, of course, a highly stylized accounting of the organization of the House.  In a few
Congresses, for instance, balloting for Speaker has been delayed by other organizational fights,
such as election contests.  Even the stereotypical practice that is outlined here has evolved over
time.  Organizational matters are covered in Hinds’ and Cannon’s Precedents (Vol. I, §§ 1–126
and Vol. VI, §§ 1–34).
disaggregated results of these battles for the years in which they exist.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section I, I lay out a summary
historical narrative about the politics of speakership selection in the antebellum House, drawing
on standard historical accounts.  I supplement the historical narrative in Section II with a
quantitative narrative of sorts, which leans more heavily on a data set I an in the middle of
creating which records individual votes in speakership races.  I discuss in Section III the
applicability of two general sets of theoretical literatures that may be relevant in organizing the
antebellum politics of speakership selection.  I conclude in Section IV by remarking on the
limitations of this paper and on future research that is implied by the analysis I offer here.
I.  Speakership Battles: The Narrative Account
When the U.S. House of Representatives convenes every two years, it continues a tradition begun
when it first met in New York City in the spring of 1789.  The Clerk first establishes that a
quorum of the House is present and then balloting for the Speaker begins.  After the speakership
has been established, members are sworn in.  A series of subsequent actions then organize the
House for business.3
The details of this governing rite have evolved over the past two centuries, but the logic
and basic outline have remained the same.  Even though the modern organization of the House
54For instance, at the start of the 105th Congress, the Democrats offered a resolution
postponing the speakership election until after the report of the Ethic Committee.  The resolution
was tabled.  At the start of the 106th Congress, the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico
protested not being allowed to vote in the election, a challenge seconded by Patrick Kennedy on
behalf of the Democratic caucus (Congressional Record, 6 Jan. 1999, p. H2).
5There is no research, of which I am aware, that treats this important rules change directly. 
The change to viva voce balloting elicited the most anxiety from northern Whigs, as the following
cross-tabulation of support for the rules change shows.  (Percentages are the fraction of the
category who supported the rules change. The numbers in parentheses are the n’s.)
Party
Slave state Whig Dem.
Anti-
Mason Nullifier Ind. Total
No 12%
(53)
93%
(69)
0%
(6)
— — 55%
(128)
Yes 47%
(43)
100%
(32)
— 67%
(3)
100%
(1)
68%
(79)
Total 27%
(96)
95%
(101)
0%
(6)
67%
(3)
100%
(1)
60%
(207)
still witnesses a discharge of minor partisan arrows along the way,4 the formal organization of the
House is now a type of kabuki theater, a highly stylized drama that values form over substance.
Both the (apparent) serenity of the House’s first organization and the stylized ceremony of
current practice stand in sharp contrast with the organization of the House for most of the
antebellum period.  Furthermore, important institutional details have changed over the past two
centuries.  Until 1837, voting for Speaker was done via secret ballot.  Following a rules change at
the end of the 25th Congress, voting began to be viva voce, effective with the balloting for
Speaker in the 26th Congress, in 1839.5  Finally, the role of the parties as organizations has
changed considerably across time.  While there are reports of party caucuses for the purpose of
66See Congressional Globe, 4 Dec. 1865, p. 5.  Nominations and supporting speeches
preceded the 39th Congress, but we can identify 1865 as the date when the two parties regularly
settled upon a single nominee and brought that nomination to the floor orally.
7Frost’s amendment did not challenge the Republican nominee for chaplain.
settling on a single candidate in the antebellum period, the first formal partisan speakership
nomination offered by both major parties did not occur until 1865 (39th Congress), when the
Republicans nominated Schuyler Colfax (Ind.) And the Democrats nominated James Brooks
(N.Y.) 6
In the modern Congress, we have also come to expect the vote for Speaker to simply be
the first formal action in which the majority party exerts control over the entire institution, with
the minority party offering up half-hearted, pro forma opposition intended for public
consumption.  For instance, at the start of the 106th Congress, the first formal business transacted
after the Speaker was elected and the members sworn-in was the passage of H.Res.1, which
provided for the election of the Clerk of the House, Sergeant at Arms, Chief Administrative
Officer, and Chaplain.  The resolution was offered by J.C. Watts (R-Okla.), the chair of the
Republican Conference.  An amendment was offered by Martin Frost (D-Tex.), the chairman of
the Democratic Caucus, proposing a different slate of officers.7  Frost’s amendment was
dispatched summarily and the Republican slate was duly elected, without objection.
In the antebellum era, the parties not only failed to formally control the comprehensive
organization of the House in this fashion, but it also was not always possible to predict who
would be elected an officer of the House even after the Speaker was chosen.  In the 4th Congress
the House elected a Republican Clerk after electing a Federalist Speaker.  In the 25th Congress
the Democrats handily reelected James K. Polk Speaker, 116 to 103, but then the Whigs prevailed
78Also note that Poole and Rosenthal (1997, Table 3.4) report that voting for House
officers was the primary issue explained by the second dimension D-NOMINATE scores in the
27th Congress.
9Peters (1997, pp. 1–51) lumps this entire period together under the rubric of the
“Parliamentary Speaker.”  As this discussion suggests, my own preliminary research into this
period calls into question this characterization, certainly with respect to summarizing the politics
surrounding the choice of Speaker.  While the limitations of this paper preclude my pursuing this
point much further, it is a subject of future research.
10We do not know for certain how many ballots it took to elect the first two Speakers.
in the voting for public printer, after twelve ballots (Leintz 1978, p. 76).  Just two Congresses
later, Whig candidates for Speaker and Public Printer prevailed, even though the victorious House
Clerk was a Democrat.  While the majority party could usually install its candidates as House
officers, it did not always have a single candidate for these posts, and could not always guarantee
their election even when they did.8
Table 1 summarizes balloting for Speaker in the 18th and 19th centuries.  Using Leintz’s
(1978) essay on speakership contests and other research as a guide to the narrative history, plus
the basic summary statistics from Table 1, we can preliminarily divide speakership contests into
four periods, which are summarized in Table 2.9  
The first period lasted through the eleventh Congress, 1789–1811.  This is a period
characterized by loose party identification among the rank-and-file, a weak partisan role played by
the Speaker, and a sense within the House that the Speaker was a minor prize.  At least four
Speaker elections during this period were multi-ballot affairs,10 reflecting the weakness of
legislative party organizations and haphazard politicking for control of the House.  None of the
multi-ballot affairs was protracted, however.  The repercussions of organizational jockeying
tended to be minor, with the notable exception of Theodore Sedgwick’s (Fed.-Mass.) election in
8the sixth Congress, whose behavior as Speaker only heightened the severe divisions that already
existed between Republicans and Federalists (see Follett 1896, pp. 87–88).
The second period was ushered in by Henry Clay in the Twelfth Congress (1811–13) and
lasted until roughly the 26th Congress (1839–41).  It, too, was a period more characterized by
factionalism than by party loyalty.  But, unlike the first period, Clay’s speakership demonstrated
the strategic value of the speakership, and thus contests for the office became more heated.
Encompassing most of the “Era of Good Feeling,” speakership fights during the second period
were not structured along partisan lines, but rather along personalistic or regional factions.
Somehow, Clay was able to hold these centrifugal forces at bay, but efforts to replace him during
his two hiatuses illustrates just how fractured the power distribution within the House was during
this period (c.f. Young 1966, Stewart 1998, Strahan, et al. 1998, Jenkins and Stewart 1999,
Strahan 1999).  What stability could be found in organizing the House in this period rested largely
in the person of Henry Clay himself.
A similar story can be told about an equally-dominating, but less well-known Speaker
from the same era, Andrew Stevenson (Jack.-Va.).  Stevenson was an ardent supporter of
Andrew Jackson, and thus was clearly aligned with the emergent Democratic party that eventually
controlled the federal government.  He was elected Speaker four consecutive Congresses— the
first time by a hair’s breadth, but the other times by comfortable margins.  But, after Stevenson
resigned in the middle of the 23rd Congress to accept Jackson’s appointment as ambassador to
England, the House was thrust into a succession crisis.  The majority Jacksonians could not settle
on a single candidate, resulting in a first ballot in which six Jacksonians received more than ten
votes, including four (Richard H. Wilde [Ga.], James K. Polk [Tenn.], Joel Sutherland [Penn.],
9and John Bell [Tenn.]) who received more than thirty.  After ten ballots Bell was elected Speaker,
most likely on the votes of many Whigs.  Lacking a public vote for Speaker, both Whigs and
Jacksonians claimed victory.
Another Whig-Democratic coalition emerged in the 11-ballot affair that ended this era in
the 26th Congress (1839).  Factionalism among both the Democrats and Whigs was rampant,
which led to a number of aborted efforts by leaders of both parties to build a majority. Robert
M.T. Hunter (Whig-Va.) was eventually elected Speaker, receiving votes from seven South
Carolina Democrats, which sent him over the top.
Hunter’s cross-party coalition marked the end of an era.  The sorting of national politics in
the late 1830s along Whig-Democratic lines ushered-in a third period in the organizational politics
of the House.  Party became a more direct organizing device, though its effectiveness was limited. 
The principle of party loyalty in organizational matters that emerged in this period simply meant
that House members (almost) never voted to support a Speaker candidate from the opposite
party.  It did not mean that party members automatically supported a single party candidate of
their own— assuming one existed.  At the same time, though, because both parties were
delicately-constructed national organizations, regional issues often interfered with the ability of
the majority party to rally behind a single Speaker candidate. 
This third period, which lasted from roughly the 27th Congress (1841–43) to the 36th
(1859–61), witnessed the most protracted and bitter fights over the organization of the House in
its history.  While this bitterness was heightened in the wake of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it only
irritated a nerve that was already raw.  The refusal of small factions of both parties to support
their parties’ candidates, combined with an even stronger aversion to crossing party lines to effect
10
11The vote switching also contained a couple of puzzling details that must await future
research.  In particular, just as 27 erstwhile supporters of Blair switched to Grow, along with the
one representative who had supported Stevens, two members abandoned Grow, one to vote for
Wright, and the other for Corning.
12Of course, this is not to say that petty factionalism or small third parties did not make
their appearance in the future, only that these occurrences were trivial with respect to organizing
the House.
an organization, led to the election of Speakers via a plurality rule twice in this period— in the
31st and 34th Congresses (1849 and 1855)— and led to the proposal of the plurality rule even
more often than that.
The fourth period lies beyond the coverage of this paper.  The Civil War, and the
Republican hegemony that accompanied it in the House, saw a rapid consolidation of the majority
party’s control over its organization.  The new era was ushered in at the start of the 37th
Congress (1861) when the majority Republicans split their votes between two speakership
candidates on the first ballot— between Galusha A. Grow (Penn., 71 votes) and Francis P. Blair
(Mo., 40 votes)— in addition to scattering individual votes among half a dozen other candidates. 
Unlike past Congresses, when such an occurrence might set off a protracted struggle between the
various major majority party factions for control of the House, the next step was truly amazing: 
One after another, supporters of Blair were recognized and changed their votes to Grow.11 
Grow’s tally now stood at 99 out of the 159 cast, and he was elected Speaker.  In an instant, the
simultaneous fight for control of the Republican party and the House was over, not to erupt again
on the floor at its convening for the next sixty years.  From that time to the present, with only a
couple of notable exceptions, control of the House has been effectively settled within the majority
party prior to the House’s convening.12
11
In his account of pre-Civil War speakership battles, Leintz (1978) concludes this way:
The problems ante-bellum parties had in organizing for Speaker elections reflect
their problems in maintaining political control over their memberships.  The
constant tensions arising from sectional and slavery-related debates, the
independence of individual members, and the unreliability of factions, meant that
the discipline of party leaders often was weak.  Frequently the parties had no
influence.  At best, leaders could only keep their men from backing members of the
opposition.  This lack of control and cohesion helps explain why two party systems
rose and fell and a third was born in the first seventy years of government under
the Constitution (p. 86).
II.  Speakership Battles:  The Quantitative Account
Battles for the Speaker’s chair have left an incomplete quantitative trace.  In the earliest
Congresses, the most we know is the aggregate results and the identity of the major players, and
we are not always certain of these.  From the 26th Congress on we also know how each member
cast his vote on each successive ballot.  In this section I review the quantitative record of the
multi-ballot speakership races, before delving into a more general set of theoretical issues in the
next section.
Most of this section is based on a data-gathering project that is drawing to a close, in
which I have been gathering the individual voting records in speakership contests from the 26th
Congress to the present.  Much of what follows, particularly after the 26th Congress, relies on
that data.  In the individual subsections that follow, I will use the data to explore the evolution of
the coalitions that emerged as the balloting progressed. Because I will focus on the multi-ballot
speakership contests, I will not have an opportunity to discuss the data associated with about half
the contests of the 1839–1861 period.  Therefore, I simply note four tables that summarize basic
coalition information for all speakership contests from the 26th to 36th Congresses, regardless of
12
13The “scattering vote” in these cases is defined as either voting for a candidate who
received fewer than 10 votes or voting for a candidate who ranked third or lower in the aggregate
vote count.
14“Protracted” in this paper typically means requiring more than three ballots to elect a
Speaker.  It is my impressionistic sense that the principal divide in the quality of organizational
deliberation occurred at three ballots— which is about how many ballots the House could hold in a
single afternoon’s session.  Thus, more than three ballots typically allowed the various factions to
caucus in the evening, and these efforts at coordination and information-sharing appear to have
shifted dynamics fundamentally.
the number of ballots.  Table 3 summarizes the ballots cast by Democrats; Table 4 summarizes the
ballots cast by Whig or Republicans, depending on the Congress; Table 5 summarizes the
“scattering” vote;13 and Table 6 summarizes the regional characteristics of major party members
who refused to support their party’s principal speakership candidate on the last (or only) ballot.
I now focus my attention on the protracted14 multi-ballot speakership contests.
16th Congress, 2nd session
Ignoring the two-and three-ballot affairs that preceded it, the first significantly protracted
speakership contest occurred in the 2nd session of the 16th Congress (1820), upon the first
interruption of Clay’s speakership.  Conflict over the admission of Missouri had arisen at the end
of the 1st session, and the conflict over Clay’s succession was immediately mired in regional
politics.  Northern representatives rallied around John W. Taylor (Rep.-N.Y.), who had been
vocally anti-slavery for two Congresses.  Southern Republicans split their support between two
candidates, William Lowndes (S.C.) and Samuel Smith (Md.).  John Sergeant, a Pennsylvania
Federalist was the fourth in the race.  According to many accounts of the contest, although
northerners held a solid majority in the House, Taylor was unable to achieve an immediate victory
due to factional politics among New York Republicans.  He eventually prevailed by persuading
13
15A similar figure will accompany most accounts in this section.  The dark solid line
indicates the number of votes needed to secure a majority on each ballot.  The other lines indicate
the number of votes received by the various candidates.  The “scattering” category, before the
26th Congress, is simply taken from press accounts.  Later on, after the 26th Congress, I typically
assign to the scattering category those candidates who never received more than 10 or 20 votes
(depending on the situation and the legibility of the graph).
the New York and Pennsylvania delegations that he was not allied with the New York governor,
DeWitt Clinton (see Adams, V: 203; Jenkins and Stewart 1999).
I have summarized the balloting in Figure 1.15  The first day saw the House completing
seven ballots for Speaker.  By the end of that day, support for both Sergeant and Smith
plummeted, while support for Taylor and Lowndes grew.  While there is no direct evidence to
corroborate this, it seems reasonable to assume that this waning and waxing of candidate fortunes
was due to coordination among sympathetic ideological factions, with Smith supporters going to
Lowndes and erstwhile Sergeant supporters going to Taylor.  The second day, which comprised
ballots 8 to 19, saw an immediate erosion of Lowndes’s support in favor of Smith, followed by an
erosion of Taylor’s support in favor of Sergeant.  
Here we see a symptom of the problems of coordination that would strike time and again
in future speakership contests.  In the evening between the first and second day of balloting,
northern and southern forces apparently caucused and settled upon second choices.  Yet, at best,
only half of Taylor’s original supporters ever went over to Sergeant and only half of Lowndes’s
supporters went over to Smith.  Thus, half-way into the second day, the House was precisely
where it had begun— with four candidates splitting the tally roughly evenly.  At that point, the
early rounds repeated yet again, leading to a second two-man race between Taylor and Lowndes. 
14
This time the ending was different.  Each of the three ballots held on the third day saw Taylor’s
support gradually rise, until he broke the majority barrier on the 22nd ballot.
The results of the last few ballots as displayed in Figure 1 are puzzling, if anecdotal
accounts are to be trusted.  Much has been made in the scant literature on the subject of Taylor’s
apparent appeal to the Pennsylvania and New York delegations for support on the evening
between the second and third ballots (Spann 1960, pp. 391–92; Nichols 1967, p. 264; Cole 1984,
p. 104; Niven 1983, pp. 104–05; Greenstone 1993, p. 155; Jenkins and Stewart 1999, pp.
36–37.).  Yet, the greatest movement at the end came in the collapse of support for Lowndes, not
of Smith, whose followers should have been more ideologically compatible with Taylor than
Lowndes’s supporters.  If Taylor did indeed goover the top due to a last minute shift of southern
support in his direction (rather than northern support, which is often assumed), that would help
explain why Taylor was much more conciliatory on the Missouri question in the second session of
the 16th Congress than he had been in the first session (or in the 15th Congress, for that matter).
17th Congress
Southern bitterness and Martin Van Buren’s party-building ambitions are usually attributed with
leading to Taylor’s defeat for reelection a year later, at the start of the 17th Congress (1821)
(Jenkins and Stewart 1997; 1999).  It took twelve ballots and two days to overturn Taylor and
elect Philip P. Barbour (R-Va.) to the Speaker’s chair.  The puzzle in Barbour’s election comes
out of his position on the burning issue of the day:  he was the most ultra of all southern pro-
slavery congressmen, and thus about as far from the House median as humanly possible.  Jenkins
and Stewart (1997; 1999) suggest that Taylor’s defeat in favor of Barbour resulted from the
15
16The first day saw seven ballots taken.  The second day saw five ballots.
intrigues of Sen. Martin Van Buren (R-N.Y.), who both had a parochial score to settle with his
fellow New Yorker and a large-scale political project to pursue— of building a national political
party that could put slavery to the side (Aldrich 1995).  On the one hand, the fire breathing
Barbour seemed like a strange horse for Van Buren to back, given the Little Magician’s larger
political interests.  However, as Jenkins and Stewart (1997; 1999) show, Barbour did not act on
his ultra inclinations as Speaker, and in fact trusted much of the legislative work in the House to
moderates of both parties throughout the Congress.
In Figure 2 I have graphed out a summary of the balloting at the start of the 17th
Congress.  Like the previous Speaker race, this one started out as a four-candidate affair,
featuring three Republicans and a Federalist.  And, like the second session of the 16th Congress,
the race quickly became a deadlock dominated by two people.16  Throughout the two days of
balloting, support for Taylor stayed firm.  However, at the start of the second day, supporters of
Caesar Rodney (R-Del.) shifted to Barbour, who consolidated his support over the next five
ballots to eventually prevail on the twelfth.
16
23rd Congress, 2nd session
Just as the departure of Clay from the Speakership opened up the House to an unruly process of
picking a successor in the middle of the 16th Congress, Andrew Stevenson’s departure in 1834
(23rd Congress), after three and one-half Congresses as Speaker, created another fracas.  He was
replaced by John Bell (Jack.-Tenn.), another Republican, but of a different stripe.  Stevenson had
been a stalwart defender of the Jackson administration.  Follett (1896, pp. 84–85) claims that
Stevenson worked directly with the administration to effect smooth legislative sailing for its
proposals and that this friendship was rewarded, in a quid pro quo fashion, by his later
appointment to the Court of St. James.
I have graphed out the progress of the balloting in Figure 3.  Of all the multi-ballot
speakership battles in American history, this one saw the most fragmented beginning.  Six
candidates— all Jacksonians of one stripe or the other— garnered significant support on the first
ballot.  Yet unlike the previous two cases and most of the remaining ones, this battle quickly
devolved into a two-man race, between Bell and Polk, with support for both gradually rising over
time.
Of all the races in this century, the Bell-Polk race in the 23rd Congress is one of the
easiest to cast in terms of the standard spatial model.  This is illustrated in Figure 4.  The curve
shows the distribution of first dimension D-NOMINATE scores among members of the 23rd
Congress.  The locations of the six speakership candidates are also noted, along with the chamber
median.  Although all of the candidates were nominally in the same party, they were clustered into
two regions.  Speight and Polk appealed to hardcore Jacksonians while the other four could
17
17Bell, and his compatriots on the “right” of the Republican party, were National
Republicans, migrating to the Whigs.
potentially appeal even to Whigs.  Indeed, Bell was located almost precisely at the median of the
chamber, and thus quite readily appealable to the other side.17
Wilde’s early lead in the balloting is not surprising, given the spatial representation, since
he could appeal most directly to the Whig vote.  Speight, the most hopeless of the six candidates
spatially, dropped out first, to the benefit of Polk’s numbers.  On the right-hand side of the
contest, however, it does not appear that the candidates and their followers were very well
coordinated.  Both Sutherland and Wilde began to leak support early on, but both Wayne and Bell
benefitted about equally.  It was only after Wayne’s supporters began flocking to Bell in the 7th
ballot that the median voter theorem started to work its inexorable logic.  
Although both Whigs and Republicans declared victory in the election of Bell, the spatial
analysis suggests that the Whigs had the most to expect out of the new Speaker.  Of course Bell,
himself, eventually adopted the Whig label explicitly, suggesting that entering into an agreement
with Whigs in the 23rd Congress was not distasteful to him. On the other hand, I show in the next
section that even though the coalition that elected Bell was almost certainly dominated by Whigs,
the majority Republicans nonetheless dominated roll call voting during the Congress.  This
undermines the notion that by electing Bell Speaker, the Whigs succeeded more broadly in seizing
comprehensive control of the House’s legislative machinery.
18
18I have summarized the fracturing of the balloting in these figures and in various tables, by
using a measure of the “effective” number of candidates on a ballot.  The measure of the effective
number of candidates is similar to Rae’s (1967, chap. 3) measures of the fractionalization of the
seat and vote shares of parliamentary parties and is the reciprocal of the economists’ “Hyrfendahl
index,” which measures the concentration of firms in an industry.  
It is constructed this way.  Let fi be the fraction of votes received by candidate i on a
ballot and c be the total number of candidates receiving votes.  Then the measure of the effective
26th Congress
The remaining protracted speakership contests of the antebellum period occurred after the onset
of viva voce balloting for Speaker in the 26th Congress.  This gives us added, more precise
information about the micro-foundations of the support given to each subsequent Speaker
candidate.  The richness of the data from this point forward allows us both to analyze the bases of
support and further analyze the consequences of that support.
The first public vote for Speaker, in 1839 (26th Congress), was also protracted. 
Democrats held a majority of seats, but only barely.  Further complicating organizational politics
were two factors.  First, the first two weeks of the Congress were given over to a dispute about
the seating of the New Jersey delegation, a slate of Whigs and Democrats having claimed victory
in the at-large election.  The Democrats, who were eventually seated, were barred from balloting
for Speaker, which of course gave the Whigs an advantage.  Second, Calhoun had reentered the
Democratic party, increasing party factionalism, and particularly polarizing South Carolinians
away from the rest of the party.
Figure 5 summarizes the evolution of the balloting.  In addition to the vote summary,
similar to the graphs in Figures 1 to 3, I have added two other graphs that summarize the voting
dynamics at each successive ballot.  The second graph in the figure reports the effective number
of candidates on each ballot, to measure how fractured the voting was.18   The third graph records
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19The answer to this question probably lay in the characterization of Hunter by John
Quincy Adams as a “good-hearted, weak-headed young man” (Adams X, p. 379).
the percentage of members at each succeeding ballot who kept their vote unchanged from the
preceding one.
At the opening of the balloting the Democrats united behind John W. Jones (Va., 113
votes) while the Whigs split their votes between John Bell (Tenn., 102 votes) and William C.
Dawson (Ga., 11 votes).  With neither party able to elect their first choice, attention swung
around the chamber.  As the “effective number of candidates” graph shows, support for specific
candidates was never more concentrated than in the opening ballots.  As the “persistence of
support” graph shows, blocs of members tended to alight on a new candidate for two ballots,
before moving on to try someone else.
Toward the end of the second day of balloting (the first day saw 6 ballots and the second
day 5), Robert .M.T. Hunter (Va.) emerged as the new Whig candidate.  Hunter was one of the
most moderate of the Whigs, having shown Democratic sympathies in his past voting record. 
This, too, placed Hunter near the median of the chamber, making him perhaps the only Whig who
could have pulled off a victory.  This is illustrated in Figure 6, which graphs the distribution of
first dimension D-NOMINATE scores for the 26th Congress, along with the spatial location of
the principal Speaker candidates on the first and last ballots.  (As before, the triangle indicates the
chamber median.)  Given Hunter’s near-correspondence with the median voter in the House, it is
tempting to ask, “what took them so long?”19
20
20The data set used in this table has not be thoroughly cleaned, therefore the marginals
vary slightly from the published totals.
Hunter’s winning coalition is one of the rare cross-party coalitions we can firmly
document during this period.  This is illustrated in Table 7, which shows the party distribution of
the winning Speaker coalitions for the next 11 Congresses.20  The seven Democrats who
supported Hunter were all South Carolinians and on the “right” side of the Democratic party,
lending credence to the interpretation of Hunter’s victory as a triumph for Calhounites.
31th Congress
The 30th Congress (1847–49) was controlled by a narrow Whig majority, and it took the party
three ballots to consolidate enough votes behind Robert C. Winthrop (Mass.) to prevail.  The next
Congress saw the Democrats hold a plurality of seats.  Nine Free Soilers held the balance of
power between the Democrats and Whigs.  (On the first ballot, the party strength was as follows: 
Democrats 119, Whigs 113, Free Soil 9, American 1, and Independent 1.)  This resulted in a true
stalemate in voting that stretched across three weeks and 61 ballots.
The balloting for Speaker in the 31st Congress (1849) is summarized in Figure 7.  For the
first two weeks, Whig support for Winthrop held firm.  Howell Cobb (Ga.) was the principal
Democratic candidate.  Although Leintz (1978, p. 80) characterizes Cobb as a “moderate,” his D-
NOMINATE score puts him on the strong pro-slavery side of the Democratic fold, as is
demonstrated in Figure 8.  For the first couple of weeks of the balloting, with Winthrop the Whig
candidate, Democrats attempted two candidates who can more plausibly be characterized as
centrists— first Emery Potter (Ohio) and then William J. Brown (Ind.).  This switch to Potter then
21
21Leintz (p. 80) seems to imply that Brown gradually built up his Free Soil support across
successive ballots.  In fact, he only received one Free Soil party-member’s vote (Walter Booth,
Conn.) before the 40th ballot.
22Although Martis lists Wilmot as a Democrat in this Congress, the Congressional Globe
lists him among the Free Soilers.
23No doubt inspired by this attempted institutional logroll, on the next day, preceding the
41st ballot for Speaker, David K. Carter (D-Ohio) moved that “any person who may be elected
Speaker of this House shall be divested of the power to construct the District and Territorial
Committees, and that the same shall be made by a vote of the House.” (Congressional Globe, 13
Dec. 1849, p. 25) Carter’s motion was defeated.
Brown made sense spatially— they were ideological centrists— and regionally— Potter’s and
Brown’s midwestern origins were intended to appeal to pivotal Free Soilers.
The Democratic strategy of reaching out to Free Soil representatives backfired on the 40th
ballot, when they finally agreed to back Brown.  The Free Soil shift caused a surge in Brown’s
aggregate support, but he still fell short of a majority by two votes.21 George Ashmun (Whig-
Mass.) challenged Thomas Bayly (D-Va.) and Brown on the floor immediately thereafter,
charging that Brown had made an explicit deal with David Wilmot (D22-Penn.), in which Free Soil
members and their sympathizers would be given control of the committees that had jurisdiction
over slavery— District of Columbia, Territories, and the Judiciary.  After equivocating, Brown
eventually confirmed the deal, reading a letter he had sent to Wilmot that spelled out its contours.
(Congressional Globe, 12 Dec. 1849, p. 22).23
This revelation plunged the House into chaos, from which it took nearly a week to
recover.  As the three panels of Figure 7 show, from the 40th ballot onward, candidate support
from one ballot to the next was very fluid.  Eventually, an informal council composed of
Democrats and Whigs caucused and agreed on a plan: The House would vote three more times. 
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If no one received a majority in any of these ballots, the plurality winner on the last would be
declared Speaker.  In the end, then, balloting returned to an affair between Cobb and Winthrop, a
vote Cobb eventually won under the plurality rule, 102–99, with 22 others scattering their votes. 
The most significant source of this scattering was the Free Soilers, eight of whom cast their final
ballot for Wilmot.
Anti-slavery forces outside Congress charged that Wilmot had given the House over to the
forces of slavery, by refusing to whip his supporters toward Winthrop.  While it is certainly true
that Winthrop was not a friend of slavery while Cobb was, it is not at all clear that the Free Soilers
cast an irrational vote on the final ballot, by refusing to back Winthrop.  Even though Winthrop
was anti-slavery, the second dimension D-NOMINATE scores for the 31st Congress— which
Poole and Rosenthal (1997, Table 3.2) report measure support for slavery— show that more
Whigs were pro-slavery than Democrats.  Furthermore, the simple Euclidean distance from Cobb
to each of the Free Soilers is less than the distance to Winthrop.  Therefore, it is doubtful that a
choice of Winthrop as Speaker would have been unambiguously preferable to the Free Soilers.  It
also calls into question Follett’s (1896, p. 56) conjecture, that Whig-dominated committees
appointed by Winthrop would have shown more wisdom on the Compromise of 1850 than the
Democratic-dominated committees that were actually appointed by Cobb.
The question remains why the Free Soilers chose to throw away their vote on the final
ballot rather than vote sincerely for their preferred candidate.  The answer here is perhaps
obvious: Given their label, no Free Soil candidate could survive politically by supporting a
Georgia Democrat for Speaker.  Thus, by voting on the final ballot for Wilmot, they could take a
23
position in favor of Free Soil while enjoying an institution organized by the major party that was
(marginally) more palatable.
34th Congress
The next protracted speakership contest occurred six years later, also in the context of minority
party government.  The Whigs had collapsed, and the 34th Congress (1855–57) was occupied by
representatives who fell into three groups— 75 Democrats, 48 Americans, and 96 who were
elected on a variety of anti-Democratic party labels that Martis (1987) groups together into the
“Opposition.”   It took 133 ballots to determine the speakership, producing the only minor party
Speaker in American history, Nathaniel Banks (A-Mass.).  Jenkins and Nokken (1997) have
recently reported research concerning this speakership contest.  They conclude that although
Banks was nominally a member of the nativist party, nativism had no significant effect on the final
outcome.  The election of Banks organized the House around anti-slavery lines, which formed the
institutional  basis for the Republican party-in-the-legislature for the years to come.
Figure 9 summarizes the balloting as it proceeded through the two months necessary to
effect a result.  The Democrats were initially unified behind their caucus’s nominee, William A.
Richardson (Ill.), who had previously taken a leading role in the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act.  The Republicans and Americans were split, however.  The Americans voted for a total of 8
different candidates, although two— Banks and Humphrey Marshall (Ky.)— dominated, with 10
and 26 votes apiece from fellow Americans.  (Banks picked up an additional vote from a
Democrat and 8 from Republicans.  Marshall picked up 4 votes from Republicans.)  The proto-
Republicans split their ballots among 16 different candidates, the principal vote-getters being
24
24Fuller’s party affiliation is subject to some confusion.  Leintz (p. 84) refers to him as an
American.  Martis (1987) classifies him in the “Opposition” camp, noting that his party affiliation
has been variously described in different sources as Whig, Democrat, Filmore American, and
American.
25I note an ambiguity here that will be cleared up in future drafts: The comment about
support shifting from Orr to Aikin involves an analysis of voting between the 132nd and 133rd
ballots.
Lewis Campbell (Ohio) and Henry Fuller (Penn.).24  Voting proceeded for about a week until the
anti-slavery forces caucused and agreed on Banks as their candidate.  Campbell withdrew on
December 7, leaving Banks the primary anti-slavery candidate from the 28th ballot onward.  
For the next month and a half, the balloting was virtually unchanged.  Banks consistently
fell about five votes short of a majority, while Richardson’s support held at about 75 to 80 votes
throughout.  Henry Fuller continued to receive 30 to 35 votes, with the rest scattered.  After
nearly two months of balloting, the prospect of a deadlocked Congress was real.  The Democratic
leadership, therefore, changed its opposition to plurality election, allowing it to go forward and
for the House to be organized.  
Table 8, which is a cross-tabulation of speakership support on the 100th and 133rd ballots,
summarizes shifting bases of support toward the end of the balloting.  On the last day of balloting,
the Democrats (who had briefly shifted their support to James Orr [D-S.C.]), all moved en masse
to William Aiken (D-S.C.).25
Interestingly enough, Aiken picked up support on the last ballot from 26 erstwhile Fuller
supporters.  This would not have been predicted at the outset of the balloting, since Fuller’s
earliest support came from northern anti-slavery forces.  However, as the balloting had
25
26This is seen by comparing the composition of Fuller’s support on the 1st and 100th
ballots:
1st ballot 100th ballot
Party
Slave
state
Free
state Total
Slave
state
Free
State Total
American 1 1 2 24 3 27
Opposition 0 15 15 0 5 5
Total 1 16 17 24 8 32
progressed, Fuller shed his anti-slavery support and picked up comparable support from southern,
pro-slavery, Americans.26  
What is most interesting about the composition of Banks’s final coalition of support, is
that he picked up 15 votes from members who, just a few days before, had started regularly
abstaining.  None of the narrative accounts mention these 15 members— why they previously
abstained, why they shifted to Banks at the end, and what they may have received as a
consequence of pushing him over the top.  While understanding the behavior of these 15 members
is beyond the scope of this paper, pursuing this lacunae will be the subject of future research.
In Table 9 I report the average first and second dimension D-NOMINATE scores in a
cross-tabulation that allows us to examine the shift between the 100th and 133rd ballots.  This
table shows that this last-minute switching ended up aligning supporters of Aiken and Richardson
ideologically along a pro-slavery dimension, consistent with the findings of Jenkins and Nokken
(1997).  The final ballots brought out a collection of previous-abstainers who also divided along
predictable ideological lines— the anti-slavery abstainers voted for Banks and the pro-slavery
abstainers voted for Aiken.  The final sorting of Fuller’s former supporters also went along these
26
27Most interest in this speakership contest grew out of the southern alarm at Sherman’s
prominence as the chief Republican candidate, due to the support he supposedly lent to an anti-
southern screed.  See Crenshaw (1942).
28The slowness of the balloting was due to protracted debate that occurred between most
ballots.
lines:  the pro-slavery Americans went to Aiken while the anti-slavery Americans either stayed
with Fuller or abstained.
Table 9 also confirms the finding of Jenkins and Nokken (1997) that the final coalition of
Banks’s support did not include a significant contingent of nativists, which is measured along the
second D-NOMINATE dimension.  However, that’s not to say that nativism had no effects on the
balloting.  The nativists, toward the end, threw their support to Fuller.  On the very last ballot the
most committed nativists either stayed with Fuller or abstained.  While still nativist in overall
sentiments, the former Fuller supporters who went over to Aiken on the final ballot were more
moderate in their views.  Even though this is not statistically significant, the final reshuffling of
previous abstainers is also consistent with this pattern:  the pro-Aiken forces among this group
were slightly more nativist than the ones who broke for Banks, while the one vote that Fuller
picked up among the former abstainers came from a strong nativist, Jacobon Brown (A-Penn.)
36th Congress
The final protracted speakership contest in the antebellum era is more famous for the outcome
than for the process that arrived at it.27  In 1859, after 44 ballots that stretched over two months,28
first-term Republican William Pennington (N.J.), whose principal virtues were his juniority and
unknown position on slavery, was elected Speaker.
27
29The Opposition candidates were all from slave states.  Most who had served in the
previous Congress had been Americans.  Using the first dimension D-NOMINATE score, the
Opposition representatives occupied the middle-left of the space, with an average score of  -.13,
compared to an average of -.38 for the Democrats, .40 for the Republicans, and .04 overall.
The development of the balloting is summarized in Figure 10.  The first ballot revealed
that the Republicans held a plurality of seats:  108 versus 80 regular Democrats, 7 Anti-
Lecompton Democrats,  6 Independent Democrats, 4 Americans, and 18 “Opposition”
members.29  On the first ballot, the Democrats lined up behind Thomas Bocock (Va., 86 votes),
the Americans supported Alexander Boteler (Va., 14 votes), and the Republicans split between
John Sherman (Ohio, 66 votes) and Galusha Grow (Penn., 43 votes).  Although Sherman himself
seemed significantly more moderate on the slavery issue than Grow, support for neither man
appears to have been ideological.  Rather, the division was regional, which Grow’s support
primarily coming from his home state delegation and Sherman drawing from throughout the
north.  Thus, on the second ballot Grow withdrew his name, the Republicans rallied behind
Sherman, where they stayed, virtually unchanged, until the end.
The Democrats, on the other hand, were a different story.  They stayed united behind
Bocock until the 12th ballot (19 Dec. 1859).  With Bocock stuck at between 88 and 85 votes, he
withdrew on the 12th ballot, and the Democrats only rarely unified behind a single candidate from
that point forward (Congressional Globe 19 Dec. 1859, p. 188).  This is illustrated in each of the
panels in Figure 10.  After the 12th ballot, the lines that graph out support for all candidates
except Sherman become a tangled mess.  The number of effective candidates shoots up to around
3.5, where it stayed until the final five ballots.  Finally, candidate support from one ballot to the
28
30Martis’s (1987) “Independent Democrats” were no different ideologically from the
regular Democrats.
next was very fickle.  Even with Sherman’s base secure, for much of the balloting between 30%
and 40% of the votes were changed from one ballot to the next.
The problem of constructing a winning coalition is illustrated in Figure 11, which shows
the ideological configuration of the House with first dimension D-NOMINATE scores.  In this
figure, the small vertical hatches are the ideological location of all members who voted on the first
ballot, arranged by party.  The triangles indicate the location of each party’s median.  The
ideological distribution of the chamber is also indicated on the figure.  Finally, the ideological
location of each of the major candidates who emerged through the proceedings is indicated at the
bottom.
As to the general ideological distribution of the chamber, three major partisan blocs were
located spatially between the Democrats and Republicans— the “Opposition” camp, the
Americans, and the “Anti-Lecompton Democrats.”30  If these minor “parties” were cohesive, any
one of these could have joined with the Republicans to produce a majority.  However, each of
these blocs was about as heterogeneous as the two major parties, and thus the strategic problem
that faced both parties was how to pick off the most centrist individuals of each bloc.
Which is consistent with how the balloting emerged.  The first ballot saw both parties
engage in ideological position-taking, resulting in deadlock.  One of the two Republican
candidates— Grow— and the Democratic candidate— Bocock— were on the extreme ends of their
respective parties.  Although Boteler— the major Opposition candidate— lay between the two, and
thus was more congenial to the median voter, he was still fairly close to the center of the
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Democratic contingent.  The second round of voting, however, saw two of the three blocs change
horses, as they attempted to appeal to the chamber’s middle.  Grow deferred to the more
moderate Sherman and the Opposition forces rallied behind the more moderate John Adams
Gilmer (O-N.C.).  This configuration— which resulted in the most stable long-term support
configuration of the entire affair— continued until the 7th ballot.  However, Sherman could never
crack the other non-Democratic blocs, nor could Gilmer ever expand his support beyond the
Opposition forces, to either the Democrats or Republicans.
While the Republicans remained firm, with Sherman and the Opposition forces alternating
between Boteler and Gilmer, the Democrats engaged in a desperate search for a candidate who
would be agreeable to the Opposition.  This mostly led to chaos, as the Democrats failed to agree
among themselves.  At its most extreme, Democrats gave their ballots to 21 different candidates
on the 12th ballot.  More typically, on average, Democrats scattered their support among 7.5
candidates on each ballot in the 36th Congress.
All was not chaos, however, and periodically the Democrats were able to coordinate their
support for a single candidate over short periods of time.  For instance, on the 17th ballot, the
Democrats united behind John S. Millson (D-Va.) and  Boteler withdrew in Millson’s favor.  For
the first time, it appeared that a cross-party coalition had been constructed.  Millson received 92
votes, which were contributed by 74 Democrats and a total of 18 other non-Republicans. 
Unfortunately for the Democrats, however, Millson’s support from outside the Democratic party
came only from southerners.  Millson received a declining tally over the next three ballots; Gilmer
re-emerged as the Opposition candidate, leaving the Democrats again alone to stew in their
indecision.
30
31See Congressional Globe, 27 Jan. 1860, pp. 611–21.  This passage is a remarkable
public accounting of vote switching, logrolling, and charges of betrayal.  While Leintz (1978)
claims that the net result of all this vote switching robbed Smith of the speakership, my own
reading of the account suggests the opposite.  In any event, events on the floor immediately
following the 39th ballot deserve closer attention from scholars of Congress and secession
politics.
Another cross-party coalition emerged in the 23rd ballot, this time with southern
Democrats agreeing to back Horace Maynard (O-Tenn.).  Northern Democrats failed to support
Maynard, and so his candidacy was a flash in the pan.  The Democrats again descended into the
slough of despond until the 29th ballot, when they settled on Andrew Jackson Hamilton (Ind. D-
Tex.).  Drawn from the mainstream of the Democratic party (though not radical), Hamilton also
could not gain non-Democratic support in the midwest and north, and was eventually abandoned.
A month passed until another cross-party coalition emerged around William N.H. Smith
(O-N.C.).  Smith came within two votes of receiving a majority on the 39th ballot.  Unlike
previous coalitional efforts, this one was finally national in scope, a fact publicly acknowledged by
statements made by Democrats and Opposition members as the balloting progressed.31  Smith
even picked up the support of two Republicans, George Briggs (R-N.Y.) and William Millward
(R-Penn.).
Smith had a virtue that all the previous major candidates lacked:  he was a political
unknown.  He was a first-term member, professing a Whig political lineage, who had served in a
judicial position in North Carolina immediately prior to his election.
Smith’s success and near-victory prompted the Republicans to try a similar strategy.  Over
the next weekend, Democratic and Republican leaders negotiated a plan to end the stalemate.  In
31
32See the proceedings in the Congressional Globe, 30 Ja. 1860, pp. 635–36.
the interim, the Republicans also cast around for a candidate who would have an appeal similar to
Smith’s.  They found their man in William Pennington.
The final round of voting began as a face-off between the two political unknowns.  From
the 40th to 42nd ballots, support for Pennington held firm at 115 and support for Smith held at
113.  The balance in each case was held by a half-dozen members who voted for an equal number
of other candidates.  Learning anything systematic about these members is difficult, given their
small number.  Smith’s previous national, cross-party coalition held firm.  Pennington’s advantage
come in the unification of the Republican party around him, plus the addition of five Anti-
Lecompton Democrats
Pennington finally prevailed on the 44th ballot, by one vote.  In the penultimate ballot, the
national coalition supporting Smith weakened.  On that ballot, amid allegations that Smith
harbored Know-Nothing sentiments, support was shifted from Smith to John A. McClernand (D-
Ill.).32  McClernand’s support was also national and cross-party, but he was unable to hang onto
21 southern Opposition members, who scattered their votes among seven other candidates.  In the
final ballot the Smith-McClernand national coalition was dissolved altogether, as southern
Opposition members reunited around Gilmer.  The party distribution of the final support for all
candidates is summarized in Table 10.
In Figure 12 I have summarized the ideological configuration of the final ballot.  It has
commonly been noted that the outcome of this speakership contest cemented the Republican
party’s position as one of the major parties in American politics and, most importantly, cemented
its position as a regional party.  (But, see Jenkins and Nokken [1997].)  As Leintz (1978, p. 86)
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notes, Pennington received 116 out of 140 possible free state votes, leaving the opposition to the
south.  As Figure 12 also illustrates, the Republican party was ideologically cohesive, at least in its
organization of the 36th Congress, while the opposition was split.  It is also important to note that
in the 36th Congress, the opposition to the Republican party was divided into three identifiable
camps.  The Democrats continued as a broad coalition representing a wide range of pro-slavery
sentiment.  For whatever reasons— most likely electoral— two non-trivial pro-slavery blocs in the
House were unwilling to align publicly with this broad coalition.  One bloc— which threw away
their votes for Speaker on the final ballot— ranged across the pro-slavery ideological spectrum,
but clustered a bit more heavily at the ultra end.  The other, which supported Gilmer in the end,
was less strongly wedded to the institution of slavery, even though most of these were from the
border states.
III.  Speakership Battles:  The Theoretical Accounts
In the previous two sections I developed two related empirical accounts of speakership battles in
the antebellum House of Representatives.  Because the organization of the antebellum House is
not a topic that has excited a large amount of empirical work, simply laying out the basic facts of
the case is an important first step in understanding the evolution of Congress.  However, if we are
interested in generalization, then these contests also become the venue for applying and testing
theories about coalition formation in legislatures.  This paper is a preliminary exploration, and
therefore I will not fully develop the theoretical side of this inquiry.  However, it is important to
establish the theoretical relevance of this period, as well as its historical significance.
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There are at least two theoretical literatures that can help order an investigation into the
organization of the antebellum House.  The first is the general literature on coalition formation in
legislatures.  The second is more specific to the United States Congress and relates to the
ability— or inability— of political parties to act as “legislative cartels” (Cox and McCubbins 1993,
chap. 4).  I discuss the applicability of each theory to this historical period, in turn.
General theories of coalition formation
The lack of party discipline during most of the antebellum House of Representatives and chaotic
organizational politics brings to mind a generation of social choice theory that informed us that
chaos should reign in simple, atomistic legislatures.  The historical record I have just reviewed is
full of examples in which there was clearly no obvious “equilibrium of tastes” in the House, at
least so far as organizational matters were concerned.  Poole and Rosenthal (1997) echo this
analysis, in their research on the spatial contours of congressional voting through the ages.  They
note that the Era of Good Feelings, which comes in the middle of the time period covered in this
paper, can best be characterized as an era of “spatial collapse” (p. 53).
Yet the social choice literature— both theory and theoretically-guided empirical
work— does not suggest that life in an atomistic legislature should be entirely alien and beyond
systematic analysis.  Rather, in a rather raw state of nature, we can still discern some theoretical
principles that might help us impose order on the chaotic behavior we observe, helping us to come
to a more precise understanding of organizational politics in the antebellum period.
Riker and the size principle.  The most basic of coalition theories that are relevant to
understanding antebellum speakership races is Riker’s Theory of Political Coalitions (1962).  The
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idea that forms the core of Riker’s analysis is the size principle, or the statement that “in n-
person, zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and
where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur” (p. 32).  Under the
conditions Riker specifies, winning coalitions should be minimal.  This prediction is certainly
testable.  But, Riker’s analysis also offers more than simply a prediction about the size of winning
coalitions in the House.  Yet, we will start there.
Figure 13 displays the distribution of winning Speakership coalitions in the antebellum era,
controlling for whether the contest was single- or multi-ballot.  Almost no single-ballot
speakership contests were resolved with a winning coalition even approaching minimal size.  Of
the 24 single-ballot contests during this period, only 3 saw the winner receive 53% of the ballots
cast or fewer.  On the other hand, of the 14 multi-ballot affairs, 9 were resolved by a winner
receiving fewer than 53% of the ballots cast.
Before we get too far into testing the most obvious prediction of Riker’s size principle, it
is necessary to ask whether the conditions he specified actually apply to the empirical topic of this
paper.  It is easier to accept some assumptions than others.  For instance, it appears that the
principal actors assumed that obtaining the speakership entitled the winner to decide how a pot of
political benefits that was more-or-less fixed in the short-term would be distributed.  Thus, it is
reasonable to treat these contests as zero-sum games.  
But,  were these actually n-person games, with n fixed, even in the short-term?  Because
of the vagaries of travel in the early 19th century and the frequency of electoral challenges, it was
not always perfectly clear who was playing the “Elect a Speaker” game at any given time.  The
late arrival of tardy members or the decision in a disputed elections case could affect the stability
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of a winning coalition or its effectiveness in the future.  For instance, the multi-ballot contest in
the 26th Congress came amidst an election dispute that threw into doubt the viability of the entire
New Jersey delegation.  Having elected a Speaker and distributed committee assignments on the
basis of one winning coalition, it was quite possible for that coalition to find itself in the minority,
depending on how the election dispute was resolved.  Indeed, in the case of the 26th Congress,
although Whigs prevailed in electing the Speaker, they subsequently did not prevail in deciding
the New Jersey case.  And with that, the organizing coalition was again thrust into minority
status.
Furthermore, as the longer-lived speakership fights developed, the ebbing and flowing of
attendance became an issue.  For instance, the standard deviation in the number of ballots cast in
each round of the 34th and 36th Congress speakership contests were 9.5 and 8.0, respectively, in
contests where the average number of ballots averaged 213 and 222.  While this may not seem
like much variation in turnout, both contests were settled by margins of 3 and 1 vote, respectively.
Likewise, the nature of the information environment in which House members acted is
subject to scrutiny.  With turnover hovering around 40% each Congress, party leaders had to
assemble winning coalitions among members whose principles, loyalties, trustworthiness, and
abilities were often unknown.  Also, the information environment surrounding the actual balloting
for Speaker shifted dramatically in the 26th Congress, once viva voce balloting was instituted. 
Before, candidates could assemble promises of support, but they had no way of monitoring
compliance.  After the 26th Congress, they could not only monitor compliance, they could also
monitor the unfolding of each successive ballot in real time, allowing them to adjust their own
strategies as a ballot progressed.  And, of course, viva voce balloting opened up the choice of
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Speaker to direct constituency scrutiny, which probably had the contrary effect of complicating
coalition-building even further.
In general, then, the deviation from the ideals of the Rikerian coalition-building
environment probably induced House leaders to create larger coalitions than needed in order to
organize the House in the antebellum era, particularly before the 26th Congress.  After the 26th
Congress, the greater openness of the voting may have given leaders the luxury of assembling
smaller coalitions for success.  On the other hand, open balloting required leaders to consider not
only internal politics in constructing coalitions, but also the electoral environments of individual
members.
In addition to being a theoretical treatise, Riker’s book is also directed to particular
episodes in American history, including the period covered by this paper (Riker, 1962, chaps. 3
and 7).  Writing broadly about American politics during this time, Riker argues that during the
Era of Good Feeling and the 1850s, the Democratic party had become such a large coalition that
it was essentially valueless.  The grand political projects of the time involved leaders (like Jackson
and Van Buren) trying to reduce the size of the Democratic coalition, so that it would be more
valuable to its surviving members.  This comment suggests an empirical question to be directed to
antebellum organizational politics in future research: During those periods when massively over-
sized coalitions arose to elect Speakers (like most of the Clay and Stevenson Congresses), did the
resulting distribution of power in the chamber continue to resemble the coalition of the whole, or
were Speakers able to increase the value of their coalitions by excluding nominal supporters from
the institutional spoils of victory?
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Riker’s argument does more than simply make a prediction about coalition size, however. 
It also suggests that the value of belonging to a winning coalition is a negative function of the
coalition’s size.  Thus, the value of institutional positions such as committee seats may have been
more valuable in those Congresses organized by razor-thin majorities.  While this is not a
conjecture we can explore in the confines of this paper, it is the type of conjecture that a full
exploration of this subject would require.
Another general source for coalition theory that could be applied to speakership contests
comes from the spatial voting model.  For the past four decades, the spatial model has been
available, and used, by scholars as they consider the formation of majority coalitions in modern
legislatures.  It is likely to be useful in understanding the formation of majority coalitions in
historical legislatures, too.
Axelrod and connected coalitions.  Axelrod’s Conflict of Interest (1970) was an early attempt at
formulating predictions about coalition formation in a spatial setting.  In applying his theory to
coalition formation in multiparty parliamentary democracies, Axelrod considered the
unidimensional case, where parties could be arrayed along a single left-right scale.  He predicted
that the most likely coalitions would be minimal connected winning coalitions (MCW coalitions). 
A “connected” coalition is one whose members are adjacent ideologically.  Thus, for instance, if
parties A, B, and C are a left, centrist, and conservative party, respectively, then a coalition of
A+B might form, but a coalition of A+C (excluding B) would not.  Connected coalition form
because they minimize the “conflict of interest,” or variance in preferences, among coalition
partners.
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33Poole and Rosenthal (1997, Table 3.4) report that the most frequent substance
associated with second-dimension issues from the 23rd to the 33rd Congresses was slavery,
clearly a regional issue.
In applying a theory such as Axelrod’s to antebellum organizational politics, we are
immediately faced with two problems.  The first is the unidimensionality assumption.  While there
was variation within the parties along the major ideological axis that defined partisan competition,
most accounts of organizational politics at this time emphasize the cleavage that arose in both
parties over regional issues, which cut across the major partisan divide.33  It is not always clear
what a connected coalition would be in such a context.  
More problematic, however, is one assumption underlying all modern theoretical and
empirical research into multiparty coalition formation— that the parties we are dealing with are
disciplined.  It is clear from the accounts in Sections I and II that the parties themselves were
often anything but disciplined.  Even when parties held binding caucuses to settle on a speakership
candidate, rebels could easily absent themselves from the meeting, thus being released from a duty
to support the party’s choice.
A good example of this problem was the 26th Congress, which experienced widespread
disloyalty on both sides of the aisle.  Sen. Thomas Hart Benton (D-Mo.) undercut Democratic
unity behind the candidacy of Dixon H. Lewis (D-Ala.) by convincing several of his followers to
skip the caucus meeting, allowing them to block the election of the pro-Calhoun Lewis (Benton
1856, II:160; Leintz 1978, p. 76).  At the same time the Whigs tried to rally around John Bell (W-
Tenn.), but were stymied by a contingent who insisted on supporting William Dawson (W-Ga.). 
Thus, the parties themselves hardly seem to be good theoretical primitives on which to base
predictions about coalition formation.  At the same time, many of the inter-party factions were
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34These results for the 27th Congress call into question Leintz’s judgement (p. 78) that
organizational politics in that Congress exhibited “a strong degree of party unity” among the
Whigs.
loose coalitions of like-minded individuals with no single, obvious leader.  Therefore, the overall
problem was often one of coordinating the behavior of scores of individual legislators, not one of
coordinating the behavior of a handful of parties or proto-parties.
Leaving aside the problem of inter-party and factional cohesion, plus the problem of multi-
dimensionality, Figure 14 provides a preliminary glance at the ideological connectedness of the
speakership coalitions that emerged from 1839 to 1859— the period for which we have the micro-
level data.  Each panel shows the ideological location (measured with first dimension D-
NOMINATE scores) of all those who voted for the winning Speaker candidate (the “winning
coalition”) and all those voting for another candidate (the “losing coalition”) in each Congress. 
With a couple of notable exceptions, all the winning coalitions appear to be connected.  In the few
cases where a House member crossed party lines to support a Speaker from another party, the
disloyal partisan was quite close to the Speaker’s party.  
An important exception to connectedness was the 26th Congress, in which half a dozen
South Carolina Democrats helped throw the contest to the minority Whigs.  In that case, there
was actually a collection of Democrats who were even more ideologically disposed to Whiggery
than the South Carolinians, yet they remained loyal to their party.
More interesting, perhaps, is the connectedness of the losing coalitions and the evidence
these figures provide about the fracturing of parties.  Disloyal Whigs in the 27th Congress, for
instance, shaded a bit to the Democratic side, yet most Whigs in this ideological space remained
loyal.34  The shunning of a party’s winning candidate was often not ideological, however.  In the
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27th Congress, the disloyal Whigs tended Democratic only slightly.  Disloyal Democrats in the
31st Congress came disproportionately from the “Whig side” of the party, but many ideologically-
identical Democrats remained loyal.  Etc.  
That majority party members sometimes refused to support their party’s winning Speaker
candidate, even when that candidate was ideologically compatible,  is intriguing.  An important
empirical question for future research is how these disloyalists were treated by the victorious
Speaker.  Harkening back to the discussion of Riker, it is further important to know whether the
disloyal members were pushed or jumped.  That is, did they withhold support from the winning
candidate because the winning coalition was trying to avoid being over-sized (pushed), or were
they perhaps responding to constituent or other political pressures (jumped)?
Laver-Shepsle and the making of multidimensional governing coalitions.  Laver and Shepsle’s
(1996) analysis of government formation also builds from the standard spatial model, but it is
explicitly multidimensional.  They argue that the practice of allocating cabinet portfolios among
coalition partners limits the number and character of plausible governments and provides some
predictability in the policy directions coalitions will pursue.  Furthermore, they demonstrate that
the durability of a coalition pairing rides on the distribution of portfolios among partners.  Giving
the Exchequer to party A and Foreign Affairs to party B may produce an unstable coalition while
distributing Foreign Affairs to A and the Exchequer to B may be quite stable.
As with Axelrod’s approach, the applicability of Laver-Shepsle is limited in this case, to
the extent that both parties and factions frequently lacked cohesiveness.  Furthermore, as already
noted, the gulf that divided the two parties was so great that trans-party coalitions were virtually
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unthinkable.  Therefore, the bargaining over the distribution of “portfolios” took place within the
majority party.  Because the principal line of cleavage was slavery, this reduces the bargaining
situation back to unidimensionality.
Still, there are two ways in which the Laver-Shepsle framework may be helpful in
orienting our understanding of organizational politics discussed in the first two sections.  First, in
the antebellum House there were a few Congresses in which neither major party held a majority
and in which minor parties were pivotal.  Such Congresses should be ripe for applying the Laver-
Shepsle framework, if it is applicable at all.  Three Congresses fit the bill here–the 31st (113
Whigs, 119 Democrats, 9 Free Soil, 1 American, 1 Independent), the 34th (84 Dem., 54 Amer.,
101 “Opposition”), and the 36th (101 Dem.,  114 Rep., 4 Amer., 19 “Opposition”).  However, in
two of these cases, the House chose to resolve the conflict using a plurality vote, and thus the
largest party could prevail without having to forge a majority.  Thus, Cobb’s coalition in the 31st
Congress was composed entirely of Democrats.  Banks’s majority in the 34th Congress was
composed almost entirely of Opposition forces— a few of his American Party compatriots
supported him on the final ballot, but most actually voted for the Democratic candidate, William
Aiken (S.C.).  (The Americans were just as regionally fractured as the Democrats.)
Even though an off-the-shelf version of the Laver-Shepsle framework is not especially apt
for analyzing these years, the logic of its analysis alerts us to the value of cementing alliances
using the distribution of control over institutions as a commitment device.  Even when the major
action was within a single party, “portfolio allocation” was undoubtedly a matter of negotiation
between factional leadership in the antebellum period.  For instance, in the process of agreeing
upon a single Speaker candidate, northern and southern Democratic leaders undoubtedly
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discussed the distribution of committee assignments between northern and southern factions, in
those Congresses when Democrats held a majority.  Giving control over slavery to the south and
economics to the north would produce quite different policy outcomes than giving control over
slavery to northern members and the economy to the south.  In their research into antebellum
House committee appointments, Stewart, et al. (1995) discovered that southerners were regularly
over-represented on the committees that considered issues related to slavery— such as the
Territories, District of Columbia, and Judiciary Committee.  The question for future research is
whether this over-representation was tied to explicit deals necessary to organize the House.
Legislative cartels
The final theoretical literature that is relevant to this investigation is more particular to the United
States Congress.  This is the literature that has emerged over the past decade to understand the
dynamics of party government in Congress.  In their study of modern House party organization,
Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that the majority party in the House constitutes a “legislative
cartel,” in which it seizes control of the organizational prerogatives which belong, in theory, to the
whole House.  Using the muscle that comes from its numerical superiority, the majority party
packs the committees and controls the agenda.  This allows it to move policy outcomes toward
the median of the majority party, even if the majority does not apply hard “pressure” on its
members to toe the party line.
The idea of a legislative cartel seems, at first blush, to be a difficult one to defend in the
era I am studying, given all we know about the weakness of holding the parties together for the
purpose of organizing the House.  Furthermore, many accounts of antebellum legislative battles
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have revealed that committees could be readily rolled, suggesting that control over committees
needn’t lead to control over the policy agenda (see Stewart 1998).  Nonetheless, the fact that the
speakership was fought over so fiercely at times indicates that control over the organizational
reins of the institution was valuable— winning the speakership granted a faction or a party more
than just bragging rights. Therefore, the work of McCubbins and Cox prompts us to explore
whether the coalitions that finally came together to elect Speakers were able to parlay these
organizational victories into policy victories.
Recent work by Cox and McCubbins (1999; see also Lawrence, et al 1999) suggests that
we should be able to observe the effects of a party-based legislative cartel by studying who wins
the most roll call votes in the House in any given Congress.  The intuition behind this idea is
simple.  If parties (or organizing coalitions) are not legislative cartels, then the chamber median
should be the member whose preferences prevail on the most roll call votes.  This follows directly
from the median voter theorem, which states that the median voter will always vote on the
winning side— if the median voter always votes on the winning side, s/he must always be the most
frequent winner.  The power of the legislative cartel can be observed by following the identity of
the most frequent winner in the House, as control over the chamber switches hands from one
party (or coalition) to another.
Because partisan organization was so weak in the antebellum House, we should expect to
see victory go to the median member of the House in this period.  Figure 15 shows this was not
the case.  For each Congress, I have calculated the percentage of times each member was on the
winning side of all roll call votes.  I have then plotted that winning percentage against the first
dimension D-NOMINATE score of that member.  The triangle in each figure shows the location
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of the chamber median while the vertical line shows the location of the median of the largest party
in the chamber.  The curves that are fit in each panel are the predicted values from a regression
that predicts the winning percentage as a function of a fourth-degree polynomial of D-
NOMINATE, for each Congress.
One could spend a lot of time studying this figure, but three points emerge that are
relevant to this paper.  First, the degree to which ideology is correlated with winning (even
accounting for non-linearities) varies across time, as a function of how coherent the party system
was nationally.  In the first two Congresses there was virtually no relationship between ideology
and winning, but beginning in the 3rd Congress there always appears to be some relationship, until
we get to the Era of Good Feeling, when the relationship goes flat again.  After the Era of Good
Feeling, a relationship between ideology and winning reemerges.  
Second, one side of the ideological divide usually wins at a higher rate than the other.  In
part this is due to the fact that one side of the ideological divide always has a majority of the
House— that’s where the median lies, after all.  However, closer examination of the relationship
between the chamber median, the majority party median, and the location of the inflection points
on the curve in each panel (where we predict the greatest winning percentage) demonstrates that
it is not the chamber median who is usually advantaged, it’s the majority party’s median.
To summarize this relationship, in Figure 16 I have graphed the D-NOMINATE location
of the chamber median, the majority-party median, and the ideological location of the House
member whose D-NOMINATE score is associated with the greatest winning percentage in the
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35This was calculated simply by running a regression of the form:
,W D D D Di c i c i c i c i c i c, , , , , ,= + + + + +b b b b b e0 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
where Wi,c = the winning percentage of member i in Congress c and Di,c = the first dimension D-
NOMINATE score for member i in Congress c.  I generated predicted values from this regression
( ) and then calculated the location of Di,c that corresponded with .$ ,Wi c $ ,Wi c
36The 15th may not be exceptional simply because the most-frequent-winner was located
nearly on top of the House median, and thus a simpler variant of pivotal politics may have been in
operation there.
House.35  The solid line graphs the location of the median House member, the dotted line graphs
the location of the median of the largest party, and the large dots show the location of the
estimated most-frequent winner.  On the whole, these two graphs are bad news for a simple
majoritarian view of the antebellum House of Representatives, since the ideological location of the
most frequent winner is closer to the majority party median roughly two-thirds of the time— 24
times out of 37.
What is oddest about this figure is the indication that in nine cases— the 1st, 3rd, 15th,
20th, 21st, 22nd, 31st, 32nd, and 35th Congresses— the minority party tended to win more often
than the majority. Some of these anomalies are likely due to the difficulties of assigning members
proper party labels in the earliest period.  Difficulties in assigning party labels are likely to account
for all of the anomalous cases through the 22nd Congress, with the possible exception of the
15th.36  It does not account for the last three anomalous cases, all of which saw the Whigs (and
Whig-leaning Democrats) dominate the roll call record in a Congress that was controlled, at least
nominally, by Democrats.
I complete this analysis by exploring whether supporters of the victorious speakership
candidate found themselves on the winning side of legislative battles more often in the ensuing
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37In the regressions reported in Table 2, I have included the first two D-NOMINATE
scores, plus the squares of those scores, to control for preferences.  Higher order polynomials
improve the overall fit of the equations marginally, but do not change the size of the “winner”
coefficients.
Congress than those who opposed the winning Speaker.  Taking into account the two previous
graphs, we need to control for ideology in conducting this analysis.  We also need to control for
party, to capture whatever degree of party regularity was achieved— against all odds— in any
particular Congress.
As Table 7 shows, even after we control for ideology and party, in every Congress but
one, supporters of the Speaker were on the winning side more often than non-supporters.37  The
average size of the effect was 5.3%, during a period when the average win rate was 62%.  The
raw difference in winning percentages between supporters of the Speaker and non-supporters was
8.3%.  Thus, even after controlling for preferences and party, an added bonus remained to being
on the Speaker’s side on the final ballot.
There are a couple of general lessons to take from this analysis.  First, it does appear that
in most Congresses some form of agenda control was present sufficient enough to pull policy
proposals away from the chamber median and toward one of the ideological polls.  Usually,
proposals were favored in the direction of the majority party, but not always.  Second, in those
few cases where the Speaker was elected through plurality or from the minority party, the winning
advantage did not generally go the Speaker’s way.  The 26th Congress, in which the Whig Robert
Hunter was elected Speaker with the help of a few renegade Democrats, the Democrats still
prevailed in most roll call votes.  In the 31st Congress, when the Democrat Howell Cobb
eventually triumphed by winning a plurality vote, the Whigs were on average more victorious than
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the Democrats.  Only in the 34th Congress, when the American Nathaniel Banks was elected
Speaker largely through the good graces of the chamber’s nascent Republicans, did the winning
“party” also dominate the legislative agenda.  Finally, supporters of the Speaker were happier than
non-supporters with the legislative product of Congress, even after controlling for the fact that
Speakers were usually from the majority party and on the dominant ideological pole of the House. 
There are many competing explanations for why this may be so, and so we should treat this
finding cautiously.  However, this does suggest that we should look for evidence of the
mechanism through which this might occur, such as through committee assignments.
IV.  Conclusion and Discussion
This is a preliminary paper, meant to establish certain empirical regularities and explore future
topics of research.  The narratives in Sections I and II were laid out in only the barest of details,
drawing on standard historical sources and original data-gathering.  With electronic databases
each day cataloguing new original archival sources of congressional papers, it is now possible to
augment the standard historiography— which in some cases is now over a century old— with new
qualitative data.  Furthermore, the public record— such as newspapers and the verbatim
congressional debates— that has always existed contains much more information about the politics
of these speakership contests than has ever made it into the scholarly literature.  Trolling through
all these qualitative sources will be a major undertaking as this project goes forward.
Likewise, even though I have based a good deal of this paper on original data-gathering of
voting on speakership ballots, much remains to be done.  While of secondary interest to most
political scientists, the original data that exist in the House Journals concerning balloting for other
48
38Also, given the fact that the Clerk and the Public Printer were responsible for the primary
original source material congressional historians must use, their election is important for the
preservation of history itself.  No user of these materials can be unaware that victorious Printers
and Clerks varied enormously in their diligence and skill.
House officers— like the Clerk, Public Printer, and Sergeant-at-Arms— have not been collected or
analyzed.  These are secondary officers, to be sure, but their election was often politically
significant.38
The focus of this paper has been on the outcomes of the speakership contests.  While even
that analysis is only preliminary, I have not explored in any detail the consequences of the
outcomes.  The only exception here is the analysis at the end of Section III, which points toward
something like a legislative cartel even in the antebellum House.  However, I have provided no
direct information about how such a cartel may have operated, if it in fact existed. Circumstantial
and anecdotal evidence suggest that the cartel operated through the committee system.  However,
previous research by Stewart et al (1995) and Stewart (1998) casts doubts on any simple stories
of committee stacking during this period.  Most importantly, committees were often stacked, but
committees were often rolled.  Further research into how legislative organization affected policy
outcomes during this period will end up being the most important element of my future research
into understanding the origins of the congressional structure-induced equilibrium.
The title of this paper makes reference to Cox’s Efficient Secret, an accounting of how the
mechanism of cabinet government emerged in England in the early 19th century— roughly
corresponding with the time period of this paper.  The subject of this current paper has certainly
been a secret to most political scientists, historians, and observers of American politics.  Those
observers of American politics who have made note of antebellum organizational politics, and
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particularly those who lived through them, have regarded this feature of early 19th century
American government as inefficient, perhaps even sinister.  
The one topic I must leave entirely to the future is how this American inefficient secret
became the American version of an efficient secret (with apologies to Cox).  That is to say, if the
House had not settled upon a simple partisan organization of the body by 1865, it is hard to
imagine anyone singing the virtues of the House as an “institutionalized” body in its future history
(Polsby 1968).  Thus, while understanding how the chaotic years unfolded, understanding how
the transition occurred to the modern era of organizational politics is perhaps even more critical. 
It is to that topic that we ultimately must turn our attention.
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Figure 1.  Summary of speakership ballots, 16th Congress, 2nd session.
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Figure 2.  Summary of speakership ballots, 17th Congress.
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Figure 3.  Summary of speakership ballots, 23rd Congress, 2nd session.
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Figure 4.  Ideological (D-NOMINATE) location of speakership candidates in the 23rd Congress.
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Figure 5.  Summary of speakership ballots, 26th Congress.
a.  Summary of results b.  Effective number of candidates
c.  Fraction of votes unchanged from previous ballot.
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Figure 6.  Spatial analysis of 26th Congress Speakership contest
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Figure 7.  Summary of speakership ballots, 31st Congress.
a.  Summary results b.  Effective number of candidates
c.  Fraction of votes unchanged from previous ballot.
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Figure 8.  Spatial analysis of the 31st Congress speakership contest.
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Figure 9.  Summary of speakership ballots, 34th Congress.
a.  Summary results b.  Effective number of candidates.
c.  Fraction of votes unchanged from previous ballot.
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Figure 10.  Summary of speakership ballots, 36th Congress.
a.  Summary of results b.  Effective number of candidates
c.  Fraction of votes unchanged from previous ballot.
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Figure 11.  Spatial configuration of the 36th Congress speakership contest.
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
D-NOMINATE score
Others
Pennington
McClernand
Gilmer
Figure 12.  Ideological configuration of support for Speaker on the final ballot, 36th Congress.
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Figure 13.  The Size of Winning Speakership Coalitions, 1789–1859.
a.  Single-ballot contests.
b..  Speakership contests with multiple ballots
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Figure 14.  Ideological composition of winning and losing Speaker coalitions, 26th–36th
Congress (1839–59)
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Figure 15.  Relationship between ideology and roll call winning percentage, by Congress,
1st–37th Congress (1789–1861).
Triangle = chamber median; vertical line = location of median of largest party.
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Figure 16.  Summary of ideological location of most frequent roll-call winners, 1st–37th Congress
(1789–1861)
Table 1.  Summary Speakership votes, 1st–57th Congress (1789–1901)
Effective number of candidates
Winning Speaker
candidate Majority party
Year Cong sess. Ballots First ballot Last ballot Winning pct. Name Party Name Pct.
1789 1 1 Unknown Unknown Unknown Muhlenberg Pro-Admin. Pro-Admin. 56.9
1791 2 1 Unknown Unknown Unknown Trumbull Pro-Admin. Pro-Admin. 56.5
1793 3 1 3 2.87 1.95 57.8% Muhlenberg Anti-Admin. Anti-Admin. 51.4
1795 4 1 1 1.93 59.7% Dayton Federalist Republican 55.7
1797 5 1 1 1.05 97.5% Dayton Federalist Federalist 53.8
1799 6 1 2 2.71 2.18 51.2% Sedgwick Federalist Federalist 56.6
1801 7 1 1 1.79 67.1% Macon Republican Republican 63.6
1803 8 1 1 Unknown Macon Republican Republican 72.5
1805 9 1 3 3.02 2.66 54.7% Macon Republican Republican 80.3
1807 10 1 1 2.00 50.4% Varnum Republican Republican 81.7
1809 11 1 2 2.71 2.21 55.1% Varnum Republican Republican 64.8
1811 12 1 1 1.74 69.4% Clay Republican Republican 74.8
1813 13 1 1 2.02 60.1% Clay Republican Republican 62.6
1814 13 2 1 2.33 54.7% Cheves Republican
1815 14 1 1 1.69 71.3% Clay Republican Republican 65.0
1817 15 1 1 1.08 96.0% Clay Republican Republican 78.9
1819 16 1 1 1.11 94.8% Clay Republican Republican 86.0
1820 16 2 22 4.38 2.59 51.4% Taylor Republican
1821 17 1 12 3.76 2.40 51.2% Barbour Republican Republican 61.5
1823 18 1 1 1.55 76.8% Clay A-C Rep. A-C Rep. + 40.8
1825 19 1 2 3.34 2.75 51.3% Taylor Adams Adams 51.2
1827 20 1 1 2.00 50.7% Stevenson Jackson Jackson 53.1
1829 21 1 1 1.48 79.6% Stevenson Jackson Jackson 63.8
1831 22 1 1 1.85 64.5% Stevenson Jackson Jackson 59.2
1833 23 1 1 1.82 65.7% Stevenson Jackson Jackson 59.6
1834 23 2 10 5.60 2.34 53.8% Bell Jackson
1835 24 1 1 1.94 58.7% Polk Jackson Jackson 59.1
1837 25 1 1 2.00 51.8% Polk Democrat Democrat 52.9
1839 26 1 11 2.37 2.99 51.3% Hunter Whig Democrat 51.7
1841 27 1 1 2.24 54.8% White Whig Whig 58.7
1843 28 1 1 1.78 68.1% Jones Democrat Democrat 65.9
1845 29 1 1 2.26 57.1% Davis Democrat Democrat 62.3
1847 30 1 3 3.01 2.87 50.5% Winthrop Whig Whig 50.4
1849 31 1 63 2.45 2.45 45.5% Cobb Democrat Democrat 48.5
1851 32 1 1 2.94 55.9% Boyd Democrat Democrat 54.5
1853 33 1 1 2.16 65.7% Boyd Democrat Democrat 67.1
1855 34 1 133 5.10 2.22 48.1% Banks American Opposition 42.7
1857 35 1 1 2.16 56.9% Orr Democrat Democrat 55.7
1859 36 1 44 3.79 2.56 50.2% Pennington Republican Republican 48.7
1861 37 1 2 3.63 2.46 62.3% Grow Republican Republican 59.0
1863 38 1 1 2.69 55.5% Colfax Republican Republican 46.2
1865 39 1 1 1.49 79.4% Colfax Republican Republican 70.5
1867 40 1 1 1.45 80.9% Colfax Republican Republican 76.5
1869 41 1 1 1.70 71.1% Blaine Republican Republican 70.4
1871 42 1 1 1.95 57.8% Blaine Republican Republican 56.0
1873 43 1 1 1.74 70.3% Blaine Republican Republican 68.2
1875 44 1 1 1.89 62.0% Kerr Democrat Democrat 62.1
1877 45 1 1 1.99 53.0% Randall Democrat Democrat 52.9
1879 46 1 1 2.19 50.7% Randall Democrat Democrat 48.1
1881 47 1 1 2.10 51.9% Keifer Republican Republican 51.5
1883 48 1 1 1.94 61.7% Carlisle Democrat Democrat 60.3
1885 49 1 1 1.97 56.3% Carlisle Democrat Democrat 56.0
1887 50 1 1 2.02 53.1% Carlisle Democrat Democrat 51.4
1889 51 1 1 2.01 51.7% Reed Republican Republican 53.9
1891 52 1 1 1.73 71.5% Crisp Democrat Democrat 71.7
1893 53 1 1 1.94 62.5% Crisp Democrat Democrat 61.2
1895 54 1 1 1.76 70.1% Reed Republican Republican 71.2
1897 55 1 1 2.11 59.5% Reed Republican Republican 57.7
1899 56 1 1 2.06 52.8% Henderson Republican Republican 52.4
1901 57 1 1 2.00 55.5% Henderson Republican Republican 56.0
Table 2.  Preliminary periodization of House speakership battles.
Period Congresses Years Summary
1 1st–11th 1789–1811 Weak party identification and organizational strength. Speakership not highly valued.
2 12th–26th 1811–41
Party factionalization.  Speakership a valued prize. 
Strong individuals (Clay and Stevenson) dominated in the
face of underlying factionalism.
3 27th–36th 1841–61
Strong party identification.  Weak party discipline.
Speakership a valued prize. Regional tensions impeded
swift resolution to Speakership battles
4 37th–?? 1861–??
Strong party identification.  Strong party discipline at
organization.  Speakership a valued prize.  Inter-party
disagreements ironed out before formal balloting.
Table 3.  Summary of Democratic voting for Speaker, 26th–36th Congress (1839–59).
First ballot Last ballot
Cong. Size Leader Votes
Total candidates
receiving ballots
Effective
number of
candidatesa
Ballot
number Leader Votes
Total candidates
receiving ballots
Effective
number of
candidatesa
26 119M Jones 111 4 1.1 11 Jones 54 13 3.7
27 86 Jones 83 3 1.1 1
28 128M Joness 128 1 1 1
29 129M Daviss 120 2 1.1 1
30 104 Boyd 59 7 2.6 3 Boyd 62 11 2.5
31 108L H. Cobbs 102 7 1.1 63 H. Cobbs 100p 6 1.2
32 114M Boyds 107 5 1.1 1
33 142M Boyd 136 4 1.1 1
34 75 Richardson 69 7 1.2 133 Aiken 69 3 1.1
35 123M Orrs 123 1 1 1
36 80 Bocock 78 3 1.1 44 McClernand 72 7 1.3
aDefined in text.
pElected Speaker by a plurality of the ballots cast.
sElected Speaker.
LLargest party in the House.
MMajority party in the House.
Table 4.  Summary of Whig and Republican voting for Speaker, 26th–36th Congress (1839–59).
First ballot Last ballot
Cong. Size Leader Votes
Total candidates
receiving ballots
Effective
number of
candidatesa
Ballot
number Leader
Vote
s
Total candidates
receiving ballots
Effective
number of
candidatesa
Whigs
26 106 Bell 94 4 1.3 11 Hunters 118 2 1.0
27 134M Whites 121 5 1.2 1
28 56 White 56 1 1 1
29 75 Vinton 71 5 1.1 1
30 112M Winthrop 108 5 1.1 3 Winthrops 109 3 1.0
31 103 Winthrop 95 3 1.2 63 Winthrop 97 5 1.1
32 73 Stanly 21 15 5.5 1
33 65 Chandler 34 9 3.2 1
“Opposition”
34 96L Campbell 47 16 3.6 133 Bankss 81p 4 1.3
Republicans
35 88 Grow 82 5 1.1 1
36 108L Sherman 63 5 1.1 44 Penningtons 107 1 1
aDefined in text.
pElected Speaker by a plurality of the ballots cast.
sElected Speaker.
LLargest party in the House.
MMajority party in the House.
Table 5.  Number of “scattering” ballots, by party, 26th–36th Congress.
Number of party members voting for a candidate receiving fewer
than 10 votes
Number of party members voting for a candidate ranking third or
below on the final ballot
Cong.
Party of
Speaker Dem. Whig Opp. Rep. Other Dem. Whig Opp. Rep. Other
26 W 33 1 0 57 1 0
27 W 3 13 0 3 13 0
28 D 0 0 1 0 0 1
29 D 9 4 6 9 4 6
30 W 27 2 1 41 2 1
31 D 8 6 8 8 6 8
32 D 7 22 8 7 51 14
33 D 6 21 1 6 30 3
34 A 1 6 4 1 6 4
35 D 0 6 7 0 6 7
36 R 10 5 0 0 10 19 0 2
Shaded rows are Congresses when the House elected the Speaker on a plurality vote.
Table 6.  Fraction of party contingents refusing to back the party’s principal Speaker candidate.
Democrats Whigs/Republicans
Cong All South Non-south All South Non-south
26 48.3%
(118)
37.5%
(32)
52.3%
(86)
1.0%
(105)
0%
(26)
1.3%
(79)
27 3.4%
(86)
13.0%
(23)
0%
(63)
9.7%
(134)
22.2%
(27)
6.5%
(107)
28 0%
(128)
0%
(32)
0%
(96)
0%
(56)
0%
(8)
0%
(48)
29 7.0%
(129)
23.1%
(39)
0%
(90)
5.3%
(75)
10.0%
(10)
4.6%
(65)
30 39.8%
(103)
42.4%
(33)
38.6%
(70)
1.8%
(111)
0%
(19)
2.2%
(92)
31 7.4%
(108)
5.1%
(39)
8.7%
(69)
5.8%
(103)
40.0%
(15)
0%
(88)
32 6.1%
(114)
22.2%
(27)
1.1%
(87)
70.0%
(73)
90.0%
(10)
66.7%
(63)
33 4.2%
(142)
14.3%
(42)
0%
(100)
46.2%
(65)
83.3%
(6)
42.4%
(59)
34 1.4%
(73)
0%
(40)
3.0%
(33)
6.5%
(92)
— 6.5%
(92)
35 0%
(123)
0%
(49)
0%
(74)
6.8%
(88)
— 6.8%
(88)
36 12.2%
(82)
22.0%
(41)
2.4%
(41)
0%
(107)
— 0%
(107)
Table 7.  Sources of support for winning Speaker candidates, 26th–36th Congress (1839–59).
Winner Sources of votes for election
Cong. Name Party
Votes
received
Necessary
for election Dem. Whig Rep.
Anti-
Mason Amer. Opp.
Conser
v. Unionist Ind.
26 Hunter W 118 116 7 104 6 1
27 White W 121 111 121
28 Jones D 128 95 128
29 Davis D 120 106 120
30 Winthrop W 108 109 1 109 1
31 H. Cobb D 100 112p 100
32 Boyd D 117 106 112 1
33 Boyd D 139 109 137 1 4 1
34 Banks Amer. 102 108p 3 18 81
35 Orr D 127 113 123 4
36 Pennington R 113 117 5 107 1
pPlurality election.
Table 8.  Support for speakership candidates on the 100th and 133rd ballots, 34th Congress.
113rd ballot
100th ballot
William Aiken
(D-S.C.)
Nathaniel P.
Banks
(A-Mass.)
Lewis D.
Campbell
(O-Ohio)
Henry M.
Fuller
(O-Penn.)
Daniel Wells 
(D-Wisc.) No vote Total
Nathaniel P. Banks (A-Mass.) 0 87 0 0 0 4 91
Henry Bennett (O-N.Y.) 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Henry M. Fuller (O-Penn.) 26 0 0 5 0 1 32
James L. Orr (D-S.C.) 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
Alexander C. Pennington (D-Ill.) 0 0 4 0 0 1 5
Gilchrist Porter (O-Mo.) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
William A. Richardson (D-Ill.) 63 0 0 0 1 4 68
John Williams (D-N.Y.) 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
No vote 9 15 0 1 0 — 25
Total 100 103 4 6 1 12 226
Table 9.  Ideological position of supporters for major candidates on the 100th and 133rd ballots,
34th Congress. ( Average D-NOMINATE scores, N’s in parentheses)
First dimension
133rd ballot
100th ballot Banks Aiken Fuller Abstain Total
Banks .45
(86)
.41
(4)
.45
(90)
Fuller -.14
(26)
.07
(5)
-.03
(1)
-.10
(32)
Richardson -.38
(62)
-.40
(4)
-.38
(66)
Abstain .40
(15)
-.31
(9)
-.05
(1)
.13
(25)
Total .44
(101)
-.31
(97)
.06
(6)
.00
(9)
.07
(213)
Second dimension
133rd ballot
100th ballot Banks Aiken Fuller Abstain Total
Banks -.05
(86)
-.02
(4)
-.04
(90)
Fuller .17
(26)
.26
(5)
.27
(1)
.19
(32)
Richardson -.03
(62)
-.08
(4)
-.04
(66)
Abstain -.01
(15)
.05
(9)
.38
(1)
.03
(25)
Total -.04
(101)
.03
(97)
.28
(6)
-.02
(9)
.00
(213)
Table 10.  Partisan distribution of support for speakership candidates on 44th ballot, 36th
Congress.
Dem.
Anti-Lec.
Dem. Rep.
Ind.
Dem. Amer. Opp. Total
Gilmer 0 0 0 2 0 14 16
McClernand 73 3 0 2 7 0 85
Pennington 0 5 111 1 0 0 117
Other 10 0 0 0 0 5 15
Total 83 8 111 5 7 19 233
Table 11.  Effect of ideology, party, and speakership vote on winning percentage, 26th–36th
Congress, 1839–1859.
D-NOMINATE, first dimension
(d1)
D-NOMINATE, second
dimension (d2)
Cong. Const. d1 d12 d2 d22 Whig/Rep.
Voted for
winner R2 N
26 0.69
(0.01)
-0.23
(0.02)
-0.25
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.02)
-0.06
(0.07)
-0.043
(0.012)
-0.057
(0.013)
.93 230
27 0.55
(0.01)
0.12
(0.02)
-0.092
(0.035)
0.085
(0.017)
-0.025
(0.067)
0.062
(0.017)
0.046
(0.012)
.86 221
28 0.60
(0.02)
-0.066
(0.029)
-0.24
(0.04)
-0.14
(0.02)
-0.10
(0.08)
-0.020
(0.023)
0.096
(0.029)
.82 188
29 0.63
(0.01)
-0.090
(0.022)
-0.18
(0.03)
-0.12
(0.02)
0.045
(0.59)
-0.059
(0.013)
0.043
(0.012)
.86 210
30 0.62
(0.01)
0.13
(0.03)
-0.36
(0.04)
-0.017
(0.019)
-0.24
(0.05)
0.004
(0.027)
0.10
(0.03)
.84 218
31 0.64
(0.01)
0.30
(0.02)
-0.35
(0.04)
-0.035
(0.019)
-0.15
(0.07)
-0.007
(0.015)
0.046
(0.014)
.79 221
32 0.63
(0.01)
0.21
(0.02)
-0.17
(0.05)
0.24
(0.02)
-0.11
(0.07)
-0.027
(0.016)
0.050
(0.012)
.58 207
33 0.62
(0.02)
-0.24
(0.02)
-0.15
(0.05)
0.33
(0.03)
-0.30
(0.11)
0.010
(0.025)
0.016
(0.022)
.72 211
34 0.58
(0.01)
0.24
(0.02)
-0.11
(0.03)
0.16
(0.02)
-0.062
(0.071)
0.002
(0.006)
0.063
(0.013)
.94 212
35 0.62
(0.01)
0.16
(0.02)
-0.18
(0.03)
0.18
(0.02)
-0.12
(0.06)
-0.016
(0.017)
0.049
(0.012)
.70 223
36 0.60
(0.01)
0.36
(0.02)
-0.38
(0.03)
0.088
(0.017)
0.004
(0.074)
-0.008
(0.019)
0.13
(0.02)
.96 227
